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The ‘international system’ concept of the traditional triad and the English School’s
(hereafter ES) methodological pluralism are both aspects of the School that are taken for
granted. However, neither the international system concept nor the ES’s methodological
pluralism are well understood. In both cases, over the years the debate has been patchy and
unsustained. With regards to the international system concept, the debate has largely
revolved around whether the concept remains relevant. For Alan James1, for example, the
question is which concept, system or society, is more useful for describing the collectivity of
states. Other scholars simply never refer to the international system, choosing instead to
focus on international society alone. This is not surprising; the ES has often been
characterised by others as the ‘international society school’.2 There is also a general
consensus among those within the ES that the concept of international society is the ES’s
most significant contribution to the discipline. Recent work confirms this; more than one
edited anthology has appeared on the importance of international society to IR theory. 3
Whilst recognising the importance of the international society concept, it should not become
the focus at the expense of an understanding of the other two concepts. This neglect shows
a misunderstanding of what Richard Little has called an ‘unstated methodological
assumption’ that it is not possible to understand IR from one perspective alone.4 It is
possible that this misunderstanding of the ES as the ‘international society’ school would
occur less often if the ES were defined on the basis of more than just the tripartite
distinction. This would mean defining methodological pluralism separately from the triad, so
that we would both understand the triad as one approach among many, and we would also
understand its basis more clearly.
In this paper I focus primarily on the system concept within ES theory, on the basis
that, if one of the key concepts of the School is not well understood, the ES cannot meet the
potential of its methodological pluralism. This paper therefore begins the process of laying
the groundwork to clarify the system concept in English School theory. I aim to clarify the
system concept in two ways: first, I discuss the major points of the debate on the
international system concept within the ES; I then re-frame the current understanding of the
ES’s methodological pluralism. I use the proposed ES research agenda in order to develop
what I call the ‘English School commitment to methodological pluralism’; in brief, I argue
that the ES has a commitment to the explanation and description of multiple, co-existing
tendencies in IR. According to this framing, the triad is a powerful tool that captures these
tendencies, but it is not the only tool. In the last section I suggest some approaches to
understanding systematic tendencies in IR by discussing a number of the contributions in a
recent anthology on the relevance, or lack thereof, of Niklas Luhmann’s theory for world
Alan James, "System or Society?" Review of International Studies 19, no. 3 (1993).
Dale Copeland, ‘A Realist Critique of the English School’, Review of International Studies, 29 (2003), p. 439; see
also Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', European Journal
of International Relations 6 (2000), p. 396. Copeland and Little disagree on what being called the ‘international
society’ school means for the ES however; Copeland would have the ES focus on international society as a
‘causal variable’ whereas Little argues that reducing the ES to the study of international society alone takes away
its methodological pluralism, which is its unique contribution to the discipline.
3 See Alex Bellamy, ed. International Society and its Critics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); also
B.A. Roberson, ed. International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory (London: Pinter, 1998).
4 Richard Little, "International System, International Society and World Society: A Re-Evaluation of the
English School," in International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, ed. ed. B.A. Roberson
(London: Pinter, 1998).
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politics. Although Chris Brown argued in his contributing essay that there are few links to be
made between Modern Systems Theory (MST) and the ES, I think there are links to be
made, although caution is necessary. I will focus on how Luhmann’s theory can help the ES
take on a systemic perspective when necessary, as well as offer potential explanations for the
structural level.

The ‘international system’ debate in the ES
An understanding of what the international system concept does for the English
School is necessary in order to make full use of the triad, which for many is the foundation
of the ES’s methodological pluralism.5 However, defining the international system concept’s
contribution to the English School is a difficult task, since it appears at first glance that there
is not an explicit debate about the international system concept per se within the ES. Many
scholars refer to the international system and often depend on their assumptions about it in
order to make arguments about other aspects of international politics, most often
international society. However, very few studies in the English School deal primarily, or even
secondarily, with the international system concept. Because there are so few studies in the
ES that focus primarily on the international system concept, the discussion in this section
will be limited to the work of three scholars, Alan James, Barry Buzan and Richard Little.
The international system concept has never been uncontroversial. The criticism
within the ES usually begins with questioning the clarity of Bull’s distinction between an
international system and an international society. According to Bull, an international system
requires regular interaction but lacks any shared rules, whereas in a society there are common
interests.6 James points out that for a system to exist, the units need to have some kind of
shared interest or else the system could not maintain itself. He further questions Bull’s
argument that a system can ‘agree’ to rules but not ‘accept’ them. James argues that such
questions create shortcomings in Bull’s conceptual distinction; these shortcomings prompt
him to ask which concept is more useful, system or society, and ultimately to argue that
society is the “better” concept.7 On the other hand, Buzan takes a different approach to the
system-society problem from James. He accepts the basic assumptions inherent in Bull’s
distinction, but attempts to clarify it further. Buzan argues that the key distinguishing factor
between a system and a society is the shared identity that is the consequence of states’
recognition of each others’ equal legal status within an international society. This equal legal
status arises because of the likeness of the units.8
Although Buzan and James arrive at different conclusions about the fate of the
international system concept, there are a couple of related, noteworthy similarities. First,
both Buzan and James use the international system concept as a means of elucidating
international society. Second, their definitions of international system are negative
definitions, in the sense that they are defined on the basis of what they are not, namely,
international society. For James, the important question is which is the better way of
describing the collectivity of states, system or society? On the basis that the distinction
In the next section I will be questioning whether or not this is the only way to understand methodological
pluralism and suggesting a different approach. However, for the purpose of this section, it is necessary to stay
within the tripartite approach.
6 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 3rd Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).
7 James, ‘System or Society?’, pp. 274-275.
8 Barry Buzan, "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory
Meet the English School," International Organization 47, no. 3 (1993). p. 345.
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between the two concepts is unclear, and his contention that even Bull’s understanding of
international system would require some societal elements, he argues that society is the
better classifying concept. However, conceding with Wight that a society will not arise unless
backed by a common culture, he suggests that, when a common culture is lacking, the
collectivity of states would be more like a system than a society. However, he does not
develop this point further.9
This is where Buzan picks up. Instead of arguing that when a common culture is
lacking, international system may be the more appropriate term, he argues instead that
international society can arise out of anarchy in the international system. He distinguishes
between two forms of international society, gemeinschaft, an international society that forms
on a civilisational, or a common cultural basis, and gesellschaft, an international society that
forms on a functional basis through conscious acts of will. It is the latter that he argues may
arise out of anarchy; in Buzan’s words, ‘System is logically the more basic, and prior, idea: an
international system can exist without a society, but the converse is not true’.10 For Buzan,
then, it is not a question of system or society as it is for James, but rather how system
precedes society. One might even say that Buzan is implying that system causes society. If this
is the case, then how does the international system continue and co-exist alongside society
after it forms? However, neither Buzan nor James answer these questions; one reason, of
course, is because it is neither of their objectives to answer these questions because their
interests lie in developing the international society concept.
On the other hand, I would add that there is another reason why they cannot answer
these questions, which is that both Buzan and James define international system in such a
way that we only know what it is with reference to international society. In the latter case,
this is because James does not attempt to build on or clarify Bull’s distinction between
international system and international society; he simply illuminates its shortcomings by
working with it as it is. Buzan also recognises the limitations of Bull’s definitions, but moves
on from the basic idea in order to demonstrate the definitions’ potential for development.
Yet, even as Buzan further develops Bull’s concepts, his definition of international system
still leaves many questions open. Buzan explains the international system as follows, ‘For a
system to exist requires the existence of units, among which significant interaction takes
place and that are arranged or structured according to some ordering principle’.11 This is a
problematic explanation because, following soon after it, Buzan points out that Bull
associated the concept of international society with order.12 The line between an
international system and an international society is therefore blurred; all we know is that an
international society is the ‘thicker’ concept of shared values and institutions. An
international system does not have these, but what it does have remains unclear.
Admittedly, the concepts of international system and international society are not
going to be black-and-white concepts, and perhaps the problem is that too many people
have been expecting them to be. Yet if the ES intends to use the triad as an analytical
approach, it should be able to identify the value of each concept in its own right. Buzan has
offered one understanding; by using the ‘mechanistic’ logic of Bull’s and Watson’s
understanding of the international system, he is able to show that there is a linked
relationship between international system and international society, and therefore between
James, ‘System or Society?’, p. 276.
Buzan, ‘From International System’, pp. 331, 333.
11 Buzan, ‘From International System’, p. 331.
12 Buzan, ‘From International System’, p. 332.
9
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structural realism and the English School.13 But this linear relationship between the
international system and international society may not be the only link to be made between a
system and a society concept. Systematic tendencies may still be at work in international
politics, even after societies have surpassed the minimum interaction necessary for the
formation of a system. This takes us back to Little’s ‘unstated methodological assumption.’
He argues, ‘when viewing international relations in terms of a system rather than a society ...
different features of reality are brought into focus’.14 But which features are brought into
focus by using a system rather than society concept? In order to answer this question, we
need to identify what systematic tendencies are.
Buzan and Little’s International Systems in World History is as of yet the only study in the
ES to develop the international system concept in its own right. Although the other
concepts of international and world society play a role in the study, the international system
is the focus. They conceptualise the international system as both historical and
multidimensional; this requires acknowledging that mechanistic and social constructivist
understandings of the concept can make important contributions. According to their
theoretical toolkit, international systems can be understood by considering levels and sectors
(military-political, economic, socio-cultural, environmental) of analysis along with three
‘sources of explanation’, process, interaction capacity and structure.15 Their theoretical
toolkit certainly does suggest how to analyse international systems, yet nowhere do Buzan
and Little present an alternate, perhaps clearer than Bull’s of Waltz’s, definition of
international system. They tell us that international systems need not be defined by like units
and they need to be understood within their own historical contexts in order to avoid a
teleological understanding of the modern international system.16 But again, these are
methods that clarify our analysis of international systems, but do not identify them.
One difficulty is the term ‘international’ used to describe the system element. This
both locates the concept within time and space and conceptually blurs into the normative
territory of international society. Still, it is questionable whether there is a better term to
capture the phenomena that Buzan and Little are trying to capture with their toolkit. What it
does suggest though is, as I mentioned previously, international system and international
society are not black-and-white concepts, which means they will be difficult to distinguish
empirically. However, from a theoretical point of view, they express different perspectives.
Buzan and Little write, ‘A systemic perspective presupposes that from the myriad events
constituting international relations it is possible to abstract patterns and regularities that
reveal the existence of international systems’.17
Their discussion of process formations sheds light on this view. They define process
formations as ‘durable or recurrent patterns in interactions among units’ which include, for
example, war, the balance of power, diplomacy and international organisations, among
others.18 What is notable about this definition is that what they are here defining as process

Buzan, ‘From International System.’
Little, ‘International System, International Society’, p. 74.
15 Richard Little Barry Buzan, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
16 Buzan and Little, World History, p.113.
17 Buzan and Little, World History, p. 33
18 Buzan and Little, World History, p. 79.
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formations are elsewhere defined as institutions19, an element which unquestionably belongs
in the realm of international society. But this does not create a conflict because Buzan and
Little do not argue that process formations are a replacement for institutions; rather, reading
their argument with reference to more recent work on institutions suggests that phenomena
like war, the balance of power, diplomacy and international organisations may be
simultaneously process formations and institutions. Thus, in discussing ‘process formations’,
Buzan and Little are viewing phenomena, which also may be classified as institutions, from a
systemic perspective.
Given this observation, it is surprising that Buzan advocates the removal of the
international system concept in his more recent work, From International to World Society?. He
re-works the triad into three new key concepts that are based on type of actor: inter-human
(of individuals), inter-state and trans-national (of non-state, non-individual actors). This reworked triad is based on the following four propositions: 1) that state and non-state
dimensions should be separated, 2) physical/social distinctions should be set aside in ES
theory, 3) distinct forms of social relations are linked but there is no direct causality and 4)
individuals and trans-national actors are not grouped together because they are ontologically
different.20 These three new domains capture the international society and world society
concepts of the traditional ES triad in greater depth and detail.
In explaining his new triad, Buzan justifies the removal of the international system
element in the following way:
‘Dropping “system” as representing a distinctive, asocial form of interstate relations, means
eliminating (or rather relocating in a redefined form) one of the three main pillars in the
classic English School triad of concepts. In return for this, the problem of the missing
“system” side complementing world society also disappears. This revision ...solves the
boundary problem created there by changing the nature of the boundary between
international and world society’.21

Two problems arise with this justification. First, Buzan argues for removing the international
system element when it is associated with the realist asocial/power political definition.
Second, he states that his new triad is relocating the system pillar of the triad in a redefined
form. Defining the international system element in terms of asocial interstate relations is an
entirely different take from the approach in International Systems in World History. There,
international systems could be historical and multidimensional, but here international
systems are asocial. Of course, Buzan does argue for a structural and historical approach to
understanding the relationship between international and world society, and perhaps this
approach is the redefined/relocated systemic perspective he refers to. Nonetheless, the
argument does seem to leave the question of where and how the perspective the
international system element offers fits in. Is changing the boundary between international
society and world society enough?
This discussion has revealed the difficultly of conceptually differentiating
international system and international society. Bull’s own definitions of the two concepts
indicated a direction for understanding the relationship between the two concepts which has
largely been accepted within the ES literature. However, the boundary between the two
For further discussion of institutions, see for example, Kalevi Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change
in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Barry Buzan, From International to World
Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
20 Buzan, World Society?, pp. 128-132.
21 Buzan, World Society?, p. 107.
19
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concepts is blurred. Rather than attempting to define the international system as a concept
that is entirely distinct from international society, in this section I have tried to emphasise
the perspective that the concept offers. Arguments such as Little’s, that different perspectives
are necessary in order to understand more of international politics, and Buzan’s, that the
international system concept can be redefined and relocated, indicate the value of such an
approach. Yet questions remain about how the international system concept should be
redefined and relocated as well as what a system concept should actually contribute. In the
next section I adopt one approach to addressing these questions; I step outside the
boundaries of the classical triad and define the ES on the basis of a further developed
understanding of the School’s methodological pluralism. I adopt this approach on the
grounds that I believe that adopting a different perspective on the meaning of
methodological pluralism will open the door to further clarifying the system concept’s
contribution. Therefore the next section does not discuss the system concept explicitly, but
rather focuses on the questions this new perspective raises. These questions will inform the
final section, in which I will return again to the ES’s system concept.

The meaning of methodological pluralism
My objective here is to temporarily step outside the triad in order to ask if there is
something more fundamental to the definition of methodological pluralism in ES theory. In
‘The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations’, Little argued
that discussion about methodological pluralism was needed because ‘members of the ES
have tended to be methodologically unselfconscious’.22 I do this by differentiating between
what I call the English School commitment to the explanation and understanding of multiple
and co-existing tendencies and the triad of concepts. I argue that this commitment requires a
methodologically pluralist approach. Because of this unique approach, the ES has the
capacity to be both structural and historical, and thus able to address both structural and
normative questions either simultaneously or separately. The strength of the combination
has three important elements: 1) a long view of history; 2) telling a story of historical
contingency as opposed to teleology; 3) the role of norms and institutions in the constitution
of agents and structures. These points have been well established in recent ES works, which
have opened the door for more structural and historical work, but they still rely heavily on
the triad. My objective in this section is to re-define methodological pluralism in light of the
three elements I introduced above. I then re-consider the ES research agenda through the
lens of this commitment, considering the types of research questions that are raised as a
result. My argument is that there are research questions that are relevant for the ES agenda
that do not fit the conventional triad mould.
In his introduction to International Theory: the Three Traditions, Bull quotes Wight
writing, ‘One of the main purposes of a university education is to escape from the Zeitgeist,
from the mean, narrow, provincial spirit which is constantly assuring us that we are at the
summit of human achievement, that we stand on the edge of unprecedented prosperity or
unparalleled catastrophe ... It is a liberation of spirit to acquire perspective’.23 Bull drew
particular attention to this statement in his introduction to The Three Traditions in order to
Little, ‘ES Contribution’, p. 405.
Hedley Bull, ‘Introduction’ in Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (Leicester: Leicester
University Press, 1991).
22
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explain how Wight’s high moral and academic standards were informed by his commitment
to the association of normative, historical and theoretical enquiry.24 It was this commitment
to a particular approach to intellectual enquiry – not just international relations or
international theory – that informed his exegesis of the three traditions. This commitment
can be likened to the three elements I have suggested as a framework for describing the ES’s
contribution. We can read the three traditions, and by implication the triad, as one possible
expression of a commitment to a long view of history that is both normative and historically
contingent.
Traditionally the use of the tripartite distinction has been central to defining the
methodological pluralism of the school, leading many studies to focus on the question of
how strong or weak each element of the triad is in relation to the others.25 But we must ask
ourselves what it is we really want to know. What is interesting about the triad is not the
triad itself, but what it represents: the co-existence of the potentially conflicting tendencies
of power and morality, and what forms society takes in order to compensate for and/or
achieve the goals that each of these tendencies implies. Little argued, discussing Boucher
[1998], that the ES does not need to create a new classificatory scheme other than the triad,
but rather the ES should consider the bases that generate each concept of the triad.26
This argument suggests that the commitment to explaining multiple tendencies in IR
is more fundamental to the ES’s methodological pluralism than the triad is. Such an
understanding is compatible with the English School’s research agenda, which both Buzan
and Alderson and Hurrell offer views upon. Buzan proposes that the ES research agenda be
divided into the following areas: 1) ES theory, 2) sovereignty and intervention, 3) history of
international society, 4) the European Union and the distinction between international and
world society, 5) ES theory and international law.27 Alderson and Hurrell, in considering the
continued relevance of Bull’s work, more or less concur with these areas, but also add
systemic and normative transformation, culture and draw particular attention to Bull’s
interest in first-order questions of power, value and legitimacy.28
I do not mean to suggest that the ES should do away with the triad. I am suggesting
a change in perspective because the standpoint, or direction of a theory, matters just as much
as the substance it is trying to explain. Thus, I am suggesting that defining the ES’s
methodological pluralism as a commitment to structural and historical theorising should be a
valid starting point, instead of necessarily defining methodological pluralism as derived from
the triad. It was on the basis of defining methodological pluralism as derived from the triad
that Buzan argued for a ‘taxonomical overhaul’ consisting of re-imagining the triad;29 instead
I advocate a taxonomical overhaul outside of the triad. If we proceed to let the triad be the
only definition of the School, we may get trapped in it. Ultimately the triad of concepts may
still be the most useful set of concepts for naming the tendencies which we wish to explain
in international politics. Nonetheless, we should not rule out the possibility that there may be
times historically and in the future when using the triad will limit our understanding. For
example, in the previous section I referred to how using the term ‘international system’ does
locate our enquiry within a particular historical time and space. Viewing the ES’s
Hedley Bull in Martin Wight, International Theory, p. xxiii.
Barry Buzan, "The English School: An Underexploited Resource in Ir," Review of International Studies 27, no. 3
(2001).
26 Little, ‘ES Contribution’, p.401.
27 Buzan, ‘Underexploited Resource’, pp. 481-487.
28 Andrew Hurrell Kai Alderson, ed., Hedley Bull on International Society (London: Macmillan, 2000).
29 Buzan, World Society?, p. 16.
24
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methodological pluralism through the lens of structuralism and historicism, rather than a
specific tripartite distinction, will facilitate finding circumstances when the triad may not be
appropriate, as well as encouraging more deliberate usages and/or applications of the triad.
In one way, the ES’s commitment to structuralism and historicism cannot be
separated from the triad, just as the discussion in the last section showed that an
international system and an international society cannot ever be neatly divorced from each
other. To separate the ES’s structural and historical capabilities entirely from the triad would
mean tossing out the central status of states in ES theory; the resulting theory would not be
the English School anymore. Rather, what is necessary to define methodological pluralism in
terms of structuralism and historicism, while keeping the triad of concepts always in mind. It
is my contention that ES methodological pluralism has always been understood from the
opposite direction to this approach, i.e. defining it on the basis of its three concepts, which
its practitioners aim to understanding structurally, historically and normatively. In defining
methodological pluralism the former way, it is then possible to view empirical studies from
several different perspectives of international, world, systemic and/or societal.
Thus I consider how the commitment to the explanation of multiple and co-existing
tendencies underlies the tripartite distinction. This, and not the triad itself, is what is
fundamental to ES theory. This commitment captures the via media approach more than the
triad alone does; in the words of Alderson and Hurrell, Bull was ‘striving to combine the
liberals’ concern for norms with the realists’ concern for power politics, reminding us of the
necessity of reaching out towards an ethic of community among states while at the same
time pointing to the limits any such enterprises would necessarily face ... Bull constructed his
via media out of materials kept constantly in dynamic and ultimately creative tension’.30 The
acknowledgement of this tension and the commitment to explaining it is what makes ES
theory unique in the discipline.
Thus, the ES cannot hope to explain and understand multiple and co-existing
tendencies unless it is prepared to be both historical and structural. How, then, does this
affect our reading of the ES research agenda? Using the triad as our lens, each of the items
on the research agenda may be read as either aiming to clarify the triad of concepts or use
the concepts as analytical tools in order to consider other research questions. However, there
are other themes besides those directly related to the triad running through the items on the
research agenda. These include the following: transformation/change, institutions and
units/forms of social organisation. I will consider how each of these areas are informed by
the ES commitment I defined above.

Transformation and change
The study of change and transformation remains on the margins of English School
work. It is often discussed in relation to other considerations, but almost never in its own
right. As I mentioned earlier however, Hurrell draws attention to the questions Bull raises
about transformation and change in The Anarchical Society. First, Bull argued that there is
much to be gained from comparisons between the present and previous historical
transitions. He introduced, though never fully developed, the ideas of a ‘neo-Grotian
moment’ and ‘neo-mediaevalism’.31 In discussing the possibility of a ‘neo-mediaeval’ order,
30
31

Alderson and Hurrell, Hedley Bull, p. 70.
Andrew Hurrell, ‘Introduction to the 3rd edition’, in Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. xvi.
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Bull contested that the proliferation of non-state actors alone was not enough evidence to
indicate that we are moving away from the modern, anarchical states-system. To prove such
a claim we would need evidence that the supremacy of the sovereign, territorial state is being
undermined. He points to several trends in contemporary world politics that suggest there
may be evidence to support the neo-mediaeval claim: 1) the increasing regional integration of
states, 2) the disintegration of states, 3) the rise of private international violence, 4) the rise
of transnational organisations, 5) the globalisation of technology.32 Second, Bull also raises
the issue of change and transformation through his focus on normative questions. He does
not make it his explicit objective to explain the creation and diffusion of norms and
institutions as a means of understanding change; nonetheless his interest in explaining the
nature of order in the society of states has led others to argue that his theory has a
‘normative purpose’.33
Questions about the character of the structure adopted in world politics (mediaeval,
modern international system, neo-mediaeval world order) and the nature of norms raise
interesting questions that go beyond the triad and are relevant for the ES research agenda. A
good example is the spectrum of pluralism to solidarism, and the limits and possibilities it
represents. Buzan asks ‘at what point does solidarism become so progressive that it calls into
question the existence of a state system?’34 At that point, if there is such a point, we will need
alternate terms to international system and international society because such a point would
no longer be a solidarist international society. It would be something else altogether.
Alderson and Hurrell propose another approach to the pluralism-solidarism question,
focusing on norm creation and implementation. They ask how far norm
creation/implementation is based on consent, consensus or community interest. One way to
go about considering this question would be to distinguish between different types of
international societies.35 But to distinguish between international societies, we must know
what other types of societies there are, in order to give our claim that international societies
are unique and important more weight. This suggests that the ES could benefit from
completing a typology of societies (not to mention systems), asking of each society what
relevance it held for the ES.
Typologies of systems and societies beyond international systems and societies
would be one starting point for the ES to start seriously considering transformation and
change. It would be consistent with both the historical and normative strands of the School,
as well as the commitment to explaining multiple, co-existing tendencies in IR. However,
another approach would be to complete typologies of institutions in order to understand
their role in change. This is the subject of the next section.

Institutions
A considerable number of scholars have advocated more in-depth study of
institutions in world politics; here I will only discuss two (Holsti and Buzan) whose works
have particular relevance for understanding ES methodological pluralism as I have defined it,
in terms of the commitment I outlined previously.
Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 254-263.
Hurell, ‘Introduction’, p. xvii; Richard Shapcott, "Ir as Practical Philosophy: Defining a "Classical"
Approach," British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6 (2004).
34 Buzan, ‘Underexploited Resource’, p. 482.
35 Alderson and Hurrell, Hedley Bull, p. 67.
32
33
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Holsti’s discusses institutional change as significant change in international politics;
he focuses on institutional rather than structural change because structural change occurs
infrequently in history, thus leaving out many other types of change. Although he does not
specify that he is only interested in institutional change in international society, he does use
Bull’s definition of a society of states as a means of clarifying which definition of institutions
he is using.36 Bull writes, ‘... states collaborate with one another ... in what may be called the
institutions of international society ... By institution we do not necessarily imply an
organisation of administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped
towards common goals’.37 This suggests that institutions are fundamental to the definition of
international society. But does this necessarily mean that international society is fundamental
to the definition of institutions? It seems unlikely that institutions are unique to international
societies; we should therefore be asking questions such as, what kinds of norms, rules and
institutions define international societies as opposed to other types of societies? What kinds
of institutions define international societies and other types of societies?
Buzan makes a start on answering questions such as these by developing a typology
of primary and secondary institutions of international society. According to Buzan’s
definitions, primary institutions follow constitutive rules, whereas secondary institutions
follow regulative rules. However, Buzan makes it clear that the constitutive/regulative
distinction is not a basis for hierarchically ranking the institutions of international society.
Similar to the triad of concepts, there are boundary issues between what counts as a
constitutive rule and what counts as a regulative rule. It would therefore be difficult to
presume that one type of rule is more important than the other. However, there may be
some other basis for hierarchically ranking institutions if needed. For example, one method
might be to functionally differentiate the institutions of international society, and then
hierarchically rank the functions they represent.38 Holsti offers a different typology; he argues
that institutions may be divided into ‘foundational’ and ‘process’ institutions. ‘Foundational
institutions ... define the fundamental principles, rules, and norms upon which their mutual
relations are based’ while ‘process institutions refer not to ... questions of “how do we claim
status and legitimacy?”, but to more instrumental issues of how we behave towards one
another’.39 Similar to Buzan’s typology, process institutions are secondary.
Buzan’s and Holsti’s works both point to the possibilities for institutional change in
world politics. Buzan acknowledges that the work is far from finished, and sets out several
follow-up areas, including these: the need to define a wider range of institutions than the
classic five described by Bull; the need to understand processes of creation and decay of
institutions; the possibility that some primary institutions may be more important than
others.40 But again, what if we were to expand these areas beyond international society?
Could we have a corresponding typology of institutions of world society? When and how do
institutions cross historical international societies? And, if institutions embody the norms,
values and practices that constitute international society, then what drives the formation of
institutions? Are there particular values that cross history that lead to the development of
institutions, which in turn constitute different types of societies? These are just speculative
questions; I raise them to draw attention to the need to look outside international society.
Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns, pp. 18-20.
Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 71.
38 Buzan, World Society?, pp. 176-177.
39 Holsti, Taming the Sovereigngs, p. 25.
40 Buzan, World Society?, p. 172.
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Units/social organisation
The related issues of units and modes of social organisation cross through several
items on the ES research agenda, most especially the first two items, ES theory and
sovereignty and intervention.41 It is here where we may ask more specific questions about
the basis of the state and international society, in particular why these particular forms of
organisation occurred, as well as what other forms of social organisation they might lead us
to. This approach takes our analysis beyond the society of states because it assumes that
different forms of social organisation will be required at different times historically. In other
words, Bull focused on the society of states because it has become the means of maintaining
order in world politics; there is no evidence to suggest that the society of states is the only
form of social organisation that could maintain order in world politics. I therefore focus on
three areas whose development could encourage thinking about forms of social organisation
beyond the triad, 1) the state, 2) the role of units in structural change, 3) society vs.
community.
Bull argued that the state is the central institution of international society, but a
number of scholars argue that he did not fully develop this concept as he did for his other
institutions of international society (balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and
great powers). There seems to be informal consensus among some ES scholars that the state
should not be understood as an institution, or at least not a primary one. Instead, a number
of scholars have referred to the state as a “referent object,” asking how, if the state is
constituted by institutions, it can be an institution as well. 42 This question of the state as an
institution or not seems to suggest that there is room for considering whether there can be a
constitutive relationship between institutions. This becomes even more relevant if/when we
start discussing a hierarchical ranking of institutions. Which institutions have the capacity to
change other institutions? Thus, if sovereignty constitutes the state, but the state is
transformed, what happens to sovereignty? Is it transformed with the state? Or is it gone
altogether?
Buzan also emphasises the need to chart the evolution of the postmodern state.43
This idea brings us back to the consideration of the transition from a mediaeval to a modern
world order, in order to consider whether we might be moving towards a neo-mediaeval
world order, which I addressed in an earlier section. Buzan’s and Little’s method of starting
to answer this question is to take an inside-out approach; in other words, their focus is on
how units (states) construct the international system. In Buzan and Little’s story then, it is
from the units that change must arise.44 At some point, if units change or transform enough,
we would have to call the system and society tendencies of world politics something other
than an international system and an international society. However, it is also possible that
change might go in the other direction, from the structure to the unit level. The difficult
question is, how much change is “enough” to create a different kind of system or society?
And must change always arise from the unit to the structural level? When might it be vice
versa?

Buzan, ‘Underexploited Resource’, pp. 481-483.
See, for example, Chris Brown in Observing International Relations; arguments of this nature have also been
made in a number of unpublished work and/or informal discussions.
43 Buzan, ‘Underexploited Resource’, p. 485.
44 Buzan and Little, World History, pp. 107-108.
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This raises the question, why society? Why not community? Why not both? Buzan
addresses this question by discussing the World Society Research Group (WSRG), a working
group outside of the ES. For the WSRG, community implies more/greater ‘we’ feelings of
belonging in opposition to an ‘other’; society, on the other hand, encompasses more
calculation of interests.45 These definitions lead Buzan to parallel the WSRG’s definitions of
community and society with the ES’s definitions of society and system, respectively.
However, although enough similarities exist to make these parallels, it seems that Buzan’s
exclusion of community leaves a gap in our explanations of world politics. Is there not a
difference between a ‘we’ feeling in a society as opposed to a community? Community
definitions of nationalism certainly suggest that there is something unique about a
community form of organisation. At the very least, Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’
thesis raises questions about community as form of political organisation;46 for example, if
we can have community-defined nations that are different from nation-states, does this
imply that the community form of organisation does not require territoriality as one of its
primary institutions, as international society does?
As stated previously, this section’s objective was not to focus on the international
system concept first, but to suggest a different approach to the ES’s methodological
pluralism, which could encourage the ES research agenda to grow. It by no means suggests
that the research questions already on the agenda should be replaced; rather, the significance
of existing questions should only increase by adding an explicit means of understanding
methodological pluralism. I chose change and transformation, institutions and units/social
organisation as areas to focus on; these particular research areas seem to merit independent
attention because they keep arising in the context of other discussions. The discussion about
boundary issues between international and world society, for instance, often brings up
questions of change. I believe that these discussions make a case for the completion of
thorough typologies of systems, societies and communities beyond the triad of concepts. An
understanding of methodological pluralism that focuses on what the three concepts express,
and how they are generated, is a necessary first step in order to complete such typologies.
Thus, in the last section, I use the understanding of methodological pluralism developed
here to inform my discussion of the system concept. I will address how Luhmann’s theory
offers a systemic perspective that the ES could benefit from, although not without also
acknowledging the work that is unique to the ES.

Luhmann’s theory and the English School’s system concept
In the recently published anthology, Observing International Relations, contributors
address the potential links between Niklas Luhmann’s Modern Systems Theory (MST) and
international relations. Chris Brown’s contribution on the ES was largely sceptical about the
links that might be made between MST and the ES. Brown’s scepticism is a consequence of
two central features of Luhmann’s theory, 1) that it questions the basic assumption of the ES
that states are ontologically prior to other societal forms by placing world society first and 2)
that for Luhmann society is cognitively, rather than normatively, integrated, meaning that he
does not have space for human agency. According to Brown, MST would dissolve the
Buzan, World Society?, pp. 74-75.
See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso,
1983).
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system-society distinction that is central to the ES.47 Brown is correct that these two points
create serious differences between MST and the ES, but whether these differences make the
theories ‘genuinely unbridgeable’,48 as Brown believes, remains to be seen. It is clear that
Luhmann’s theory cannot explain much at the level of human agency, but it may have a great
deal to offer the ES at the structural level.
MST is a theory of world society, a world society that is ontologically primary to any
other societal form. Society, for Luhmann, is based on differentiation, and most importantly,
autopoietic differentiation. In other words, the first and most important distinction is that
between a system and its (physical) environment. This difference is generated by
communication, which also ensures that world society continues to reproduce itself. 49 Other
distinctions follow from world society in the form of ‘functional subsystems.’ These
functional subsystems are each closed systems, operating according to their own logics, what
Luhmann calls ‘media of communication’ that in turn generate ‘codes.’50 Although functional
subsystems are autonomous, there can be what Luhmann refers to as ‘structural coupling’
between subsystems.51 Luhmann’s functional subsystems include, for example, politics, law,
the economy and science.52 These basic premises of Luhmann’s theory outlined here do
illustrate the stark contrast between MST and the ES; yet if we consider Luhmann’s basic
premises of functional differentiation and its resulting subsystems in more detail there are
useful parallels to be made between the two schools of thought. First, and most generally, as
questions about Bull’s undeveloped concept of ‘neo-mediaevalism’ become more important,
so do theories of functional differentiation. Second, there are parallels to be drawn between
Luhmann’s functional subsystems, institutions and Buzan’s and Little’s sectors of
international systems.
Thomas Diez argues that MST is useful for IR because it offers a global framework
in which territorial demarcations are less important.53 This is an argument that even Chris
Brown might be sympathetic with, since at the end of his chapter he acknowledges that the
state-centricity of the ES and the focus on international society are less stable than they were
before.54 Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, when Bull discussed neo-mediaevalism, he argued
that if neo-mediaevalism were to be a legitimate claim, then evidence proving that that the
territorial state is being undermined would be necessary. However, I will not ask the
question Bull would have us ask, that is, is the territorial state being undermined? Rather, I
will ask the question that Luhmann would ask of the English School,55 is functional
Chris Brown, "The "English School" and World Society," in Observing International Relations: Niklas Luhmann
and World Politics, ed. Lena Hilkemeier Mathias Albert (London: Routledge, 2004). pp. 68-69, 71.
48 Brown, ‘The “English School”’, p. 69.
49Anders Esmark, "Systems and Sovereignty: A Systems Theoretical Look at the Transformation of
Sovereignty," in Observing International Relations: Niklas Luhmann and World Politics, ed. Lena Hilkemeier Mathias
Albert (London: Routledge, 2004). p.123; Albert, ‘On the Modern Systems Theory of society and IR: contacts
and disjunctures between different kinds of theorizing’, in Observing IR, pp. 14, 17.
50 Dieter Kerwer, ‘Governance in world society: the perspective of systems theory’, in Observing IR, pp. 197-198.
51 Guzzini, ‘Constructivism and International Relations: an analysis of Luhmann’s conceptualization of power’,
in Observing IR, p.215
52 Kerwer, ‘Governance in world society’, p. 197.
53 Thomas Diez, ‘Politics, Modern Systems Theory and the critical purpose of International Relations Theory’,
in Observing IR, p. 30.
54 Brown, ‘The “English School’”, p. 71.
55 It should be clear that this is not Luhmann’s question, but rather the question that Luhmann would ask of
the English School were he standing outside of it. I believe this is consistent with Luhmann’s approach because
he argued that it was important to ‘observe’ theory. See Thomas Diez, ‘Politics, MST and the critical purpose’,
pp. 41-43.
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differentiation becoming more important? The distinction between the two questions is
crucial; Bull puts into question the mode of social organisation that has been central to the
modern era, the time period that the ES literature has covered the most. Luhmann’s
question, on the other hand, asks about the increasing importance and presence of a
different mode of social organisation. The possibility that the two modes might co-exist is
therefore not out of the question.
For Luhmann, because world society is ontologically primary, he is most concerned
with how it is differentiated internally rather than how it is held together. Or, another way of
putting this is, world society is held together despite the fact that it cannot hope to be an
integrated whole; it is only whole in the sense that it is differentiated functionally.56 A
number of functional subsystems are therefore generated within the closed system of world
society. Because of the functional definition of both world society and its functional
subsystems, they necessarily operate transnationally. This means that if territoriality is a form
of organisation (for Luhmann it is not), then it is a form of internal differentiation within
world society and its subsystems.57 This may not have much immediate appeal for those
within the ES; it sounds hierarchical, as if territoriality has been relegated in importance as a
mere subset of broader societal subsystems. However, I believe there are two points to be
made in Luhmann’s favour, 1) that it may be possible to see world society as ontologically
prior in certain cases, if the ES takes a long view of history; using this approach, there would
be times historically when world society might be ontologically prior, but other times when
the international system would be; 2) that functional and normative logic may operate at the
same time, thus allowing for functional subsystems as well as international society to coexist.
I mentioned previously that Luhmann’s functional subsystems are allegedly
autonomous of one another because they each operate according to their own logic. If
interaction occurs, it occurs only at the system (for Luhmann, societal) level by means of
‘media of communication.’ Whether one understands media of communication as attached
to particular subsystems, or as ‘universals’ that may operate within all of world society,58 they
nonetheless carry normative undertones. Power, for instance, is the medium of
communication most associated with the political subsystem. Within the political subsystem,
it becomes the ‘binary code’ of power superiority and power inferiority.59 Luhmann, of
course, is not interested in how these media of communication come about and/or whether
they are constitutive of the subsystems they are associated with, but those are interesting
questions for the ES. It is possible to see media of communication as a link to the normative
realm that international society exists within.
More specifically, media of communication may link partially to the ES’s institutions
and Buzan and Little’s sectors of the international system. Although it would be incorrect to
draw the comparison between Luhmann’s functional subsystems and institutions and/or
sectors too closely, there are certain similarities. All three concepts draw our attention to
particular kinds of societal practices, though each concept demands seeing these practices in
a different light. Luhmann’s functional subsystems highlight how links between different
societal practices reproduce themselves at the systemic level; they take individuals out of the
picture entirely, replacing agency with communication only between systems. This view is
Albert, ‘MST of society and IR’, pp. 17-18.
Diez, ‘Politics, MST and the critical purpose’, p. 33.
58 Guzzini, ‘Constructivism and IR’, pp. 214-215.
59 Guzzini, ‘Constructivism and IR’, p. 215.
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only possible by seeing subsystems as autonomous, and a differentiated world society as the
whole. The concept of institutions, on the other hand, stands at the other extreme; in
considering institutions, we consider those practices that have been normatively established,
a process which cannot be separated from human agency.
This puts sectors of international systems somewhere in between functional
subsystems and institutions. Eric Grahn, in a work in progress, suggests that each of Buzan
and Little’s sectors ‘appear[s] to have a core logic that is equivalent to a deep structure in
their own right.’ 60 Grahn is arguing that defining the sectors separately leads to
disaggregating the whole in order to explain complexity. He writes, quoting Buzan, Jones
and Little,
‘ “When we refer to more specific sectors in the international system these will also be
identified as the international political, military, societal, economic, or whatever system…
The partial systems identified by sectors are not subsystems…Instead, they are views of the
whole system through some selective lens that highlights one particular aspect of the
relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units” [Buzan and Little ?: 31]. In
which case, why even use the word ‘system’ except to denote the complex whole? If these
systems are not genuinely systems or subsystems in their own right, then why use the word
at all? It breeds confusion.’61

Grahn seems to first see a problem with disaggregating the whole into sectors, but then
seems prepared to accept this disaggregation by applying Luhmannian logic to the sector.
However, applying the theory of functional subsystems onto sectors will not work because
functional subsystems have to be autonomous and operatively closed. Why use the term
system at all? Because using sectors, rather than referring to institutions, is taking a systemic
view. So Grahn is right to point out that considering the interactions between sectors is
important;62 MST, by focusing on differentiation, is a useful tool for bringing to light the
interactions at the system level. MST cannot by itself offer explanations of everything on the
ES agenda, but it can help us identify what is going on at the systemic level with a bit more
clarity.
This last section has been largely speculative. It has brought up questions that may or
may not lead to useful links between Luhmann’s theory and the ES. Luhmann offers one
approach to addressing certain unresolved questions on the ES research agenda; there may
be other theories that could also help in illuminating the systemic level, and its relationship
to the other concepts of international and world society. However, Luhmann’s focus on the
differentiation of world society makes his theory particularly relevant in light of recent
discussions of change and history. What Luhmann cannot do is explain how differentiation
stops reproducing itself. However, in considering Luhmann and the ES together, it may be
possible to discuss the relationship between functional differentiation at the system level and
human agency within international and world society.
At the very least, Luhmann’s theory, along with a more explicit conceptualisation of
methodological pluralism, may make room for a systematic perspective alongside the rest of
ES theory. I focused on both methodological pluralism and the system concept because they
are both ‘under-exploited resources’ within English School theory. Because ES concepts
Eric Grahn, ‘Recovening the English School: A Critique of Buzan and Little Inc.’, unpublished paper, 2005,
61pp, p. 16.
61 Grahn, ‘ES: A Critique’, p. 17.
62 Grahn, ‘ES: A Critique’, pp. 19-21.
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cannot be understood as autonomous of each other, if one or more of the triad’s concepts
lag behind the others, this can affect the theory as a whole. Thus my approach has been to
further develop the meaning of methodological pluralism in order to draw clearer links
between the differing perspectives offered by each element of the triad. In doing so, this
paper has raised more questions than it has answered, but I hope that these questions have
indicated a direction to take in furthering the ES research agenda.
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